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local investors, as foreign institutional ownership is strongly and positively related to 
both contemporaneous and subsequent firm performance Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2000; 
Dvorak, 2005). Huang and Shiu (2009) find that firms in Taiwan with high foreign 


















































































































VKDUHKROGLQJVKHOGE\LQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUV. Finally, for the investment horizon of 
institutional owners we apply the three investment categories, namely low-turnover, 
moderate-turnover and high-turnover institutional ownership as defined in Thomson 






























































































M&A deal value of the overall sample. The results reported in Table 7 show that 
 
 
acquirers with greater institutional ownership, domestic or foreign, conduct larger deals. 
Overall, institutional investors own 55.46% of acquirers conducting large M&As 
compared to 43.10% of acquirers conducting smaller M&As. Moreover, institutional 
investors with long investment horizon (low-turnover) own larger stakes in acquirers 
engaging in large M&As. Finally, the results show that larger M&As involve larger 
target firms either in terms of absolute size or industry-relative size.  
>,QVHUW7DEOHDERXWKHUH@ 
4.2 Determinants of cross-border M&As 
In this section we perform a series of probit regressions in order to examine the role 
of institutional ownership characteristics on M&As. The dependent variable takes the 
value of one for cross-border M&As and zero otherwise. Since a number of bidder firms 
undertake multiple M&As during our sample period, we run the regressions with cluster-
adjusted robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009), therefore enabling us to provide robust 



























The results reported in Table 8 show that foreign institutional ownership increases 
the likelihood of cross-border M&As. This is consistent with hypothesis H1 that when 
foreign institutional investors hold greater stakes in the acquirer firm, the probability of a 
 
 
cross-border M&A increases. Our findings are also in line with Ferreira et al. (2010) who 
argue that foreign institutional investors act as facilitators in the international market for 
reducing transaction costs and asymmetric information. The results show that after 
correcting for endogeneity, the ownership held by the five largest institutional investors 
has a positive and significant influence on the likelihood of a cross-border M&A, 
consistent with hypothesis H4. As the UK is considered to be a country with sufficient 
shareholder legal protection, institutional ownership concentration can help to 

















Moreover, we do not find evidence that UK firms are more likely to bid for listed 
target firms. The results show that UK acquirers are more likely to acquire firms that 
operate in the same industry. This supports the argument that asymmetric information is 














[Insert Table 8 about here] 




GHFLVLRQWRWDNHIXOO4RUSDUWLDOFRQWURORIDWDUJHWILUP7KHdependent variable is a binary 
variable equal to one if the acquirer assumes full control of the target firm and zero 
otherwise. We also control for potential endogeneity bias due to the type of institutional 
investor as discussed earlier, and we employ the same instrumental variables. The results 
are reported in Table 9.  
We find that when the target firm is a foreign firm, it is publicly traded, and operates 
in a different industry, it is less likely for the bidder firm to acquire full control following 
the M&A. Surprisingly we find that when acquirers already hold an initial stake of the 
target firm they will not opt for full control. A reason for this could be due to the fact that 
an initial stake can lead to overbidding for the target firm, leading to a loss for the 
acquirer (Burkart, 1995). In addition, the results show that during the 2007-08 financial 
crisis firms remained cautious and were averse in assuming full control. This is due to 
the uncertainty that prevailed during that period in terms of liquidity, prospective return 
on investments, and more importantly due to the negative shock on the supply of external 
financing for non-financial firms. As a consequence, corporate investment overall 
experienced a sharp decline following the financial crisis, especially for firms with less 
cash reserves and large short-term debt 'XFKLQHWDO:HDOVRILQGWKDWERWKFDVK
SD\PHQWDQGVKDUHSD\PHQWKDYHDQHJDWLYHLPSDFW7KLVVXJJHVWVWKDWILUPVDFTXLUHIXOO
                                                 






[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Acquiring firms, in which the largest institutional investor or the five largest 
institutional investors hold larger stakes, are less likely to assume full control of the 
target firms. An explanation for this could be that the largest institutional investors are 
averse to a potential dilution of their ownership and control in the new merged entity. 
Moreover, we find that the greater the stake held by foreign institutional investors the 







































PRGHUDWH-WXUQRYHU LQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV KDYH D VLJQLILFDQW DQG SRVLWLYH LPSDFW RQ WKH
GHDO VL]H RI 0	$V VXSSRUWLQJ RXU K\SRWKHVLV + 7KLV LQGLFDWHV WKDW LQVWLWXWLRQDO
LQYHVWRUVZLWKPHGLXPWR ORQJHU LQYHVWPHQWKRUL]RQVDUHZLOOLQJ WRSDUWLFLSDWH LQ ODUJH
0	$VVXSSRUWLQJWKHPRQLWRULQJUROHRI ORQJ-WHUPLQVWLWXWLRQDO LQYHVWRUV&KHQHWDO
(O\DVLDQLHWDO 
:KHQ FRQWUROOLQJ IRU SDVW 0	$ H[SHULHQFH WKH UHVXOWV VKRZ WKDW ILUPV WKDW KDYH
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)LQDQFLDO&ULVLV Binary variable equal to one if the M&A deal is announced during the 2007-2008 crisis period and zero otherwise 
(Bureau van Dijk).  
0	$H[SHULHQFH Binary variable equal to one if the acquirer firm has M&A experience before the M&A announcement and zero 
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  Domestic Cross-border Total 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean 
Binary Variables:  
Cross Industry       
Listed Target       
Initial Stake       
Cash Payment        
Share Payment       
Financial Crisis        
M&A experience        
 
Industry Categories:   
High-tech        
Mining       
Construction       
Manufacturing       
Transportation       
Communications       
Public Utilities       
Whole Sale Trading       
Retail Trading       
Services       
Pubic Administration       
This table presents the mean value of binary explanatory variables based on domestic and cross-border M&As. The total sample comprises 3,679 
M&As deals undertaken by UK public bidders from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010. The industry classifications are based on the 2-digit 
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This table presents the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables employed in the study. Deal Value is the M&As deal value in millions of GBP. 
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 *** (0.000)*** 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the continuous variables employed in this study for the two sub-groups of target firms: domestic (UK) and 
cross-border (non-UK). The variables are defined as in Table 1. All accounting data are taken at year-end prior to the M&A deal announcement. Test of 
difference in means (medians) reports the p-values for the homogeneity test for means (medians) assuming unequal variances across the two target 
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This table presents descriptive statistics of the continuous variables employed in this study for the two sub-groups of target firms: partial 
FRQWURODQGIXOOFRQWUROIROORZLQJWKH0	$)XOOFRQWUROLVGHILQHGDVDQ0	$ELGLVIRURIWDUJHWILUP¶VVKDUHVSHUFHQtage sought), 
following Ferreira et al., (2010). Otherwise it is classified as Partial control. The variables are defined as in Table 1. All accounting data are 
taken at year-end prior to the M&A deal announcement. Test of difference in means (medians) reports the p-values for the homogeneity test 
for means (medians) assuming unequal variances across the two target groups: partial control and full control. ***, **, and * represent 
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Target Firm Industry-Relative Size       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 ***  *** 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the continuous variables employed in this study for the two sub-groups of target firms: small 
M&As and large M&As. M&A deals are classified as small if their value is lower than the median deal value of our sample. M&A deals are 
classified as large deals if they are equal or higher than the median deal size of our sample. The variables are defined as in Table 1. All 
accounting data are taken at year-end prior to the M&A deal announcement. Test of difference in means (medians) reports the p-values for 
the homogeneity test for means (medians) assuming unequal variances across the two target groups: small M&As and large M&As. ***, **, 





1st stage Probit 
 
2nd stage Probit 
Endogeneity adjusted 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross Industry -0.592* -0.194 0.078 -0.025 
 
 
(-1.93) (-1.56) (1.21) (-0.32) 
 Listed Target 
 




(0.29) (0.70) (-1.15) 


































Largest Institutional Ownership 
 
0.006 

























































  M&A Experience 0.780* 0.043 
   
 
(1.64) (0.30) 
   Target Firm Size 
 
0.384*** 




   Target Firm Industry-Relative Size 0.209*** 
    
 
(3.34) 
    Cons. 1.490** -8.612*** -1.864*** 0.790 13.110 
 
(2.49) (-8.18) (-10.05) (0.06) (1.19) 
Firm specific control variables ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
Industry/Year controls ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
Obs. 731 1,285 3,060  2,624 3,061 
Pseudo R2(%) 79.76 23.67 
   Log pseudo-likelihood 
  
- 13,267.2  -13,213.7 -13,281.4 
Wald chi2(1) 
  
65.84 52.51 73.57 
p-value  Wald test 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Correctly classified (%) 96.72 81.01 50.42 52.44 60.47 
 
 
This table presents the results of probit regressions for estimating the probability of UK bidders choosing 
a cross-border target. The sample comprises 3,821 M&As undertaken by UK listed firms announced 
between 01/01/2000 and 31/12/2010. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals to 1when 
the deal is a cross-border deal, and 0 for domestic deals. The variables are defined as in Table 1. All 
accounting data are taken at year-end prior to the M&A deal announcement. Z-statistics based on cluster-
adjusted robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009, hence providing robust interpretations (Cameron et al., 
2008)) are reported in parentheses. Correctly classified (%) compares the fitted and actual values based 





1st stage Probit 2nd stage Probit - Endogeneity adjusted 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cross-Border - - - - 0.016 - -0.246 -0.315** 
 
- - - - (0.15) - (-1.40) (-2.29) 
Cross Industry - - - - -0.138* - -0.146*  
 
- - - - (-1.80) - (-1.84)  




- - - - (-0.45) 
 
(-0.17)  
Initial Stake - - - - -0.003 - -0.005  
 
- - - - (-0.95) - (-1.02)  
Cash Payment - - -  0.038 - -0.050 -0.176 
 
- - -  (0.39) - (-0.46) (-1.26) 




- - -  (0.16) 
 
(1.00) (-1.24) 




- - - - 
  
(-0.37) (-0.19) 
Largest Institutional Ownership 
   
 
 
- -0.191*** -0.013 
     
   
 
 
- (-16.10) (-0.90) 
Top 5 Institutional Ownership 




     




Foreign Institutional Ownership - - - - 
   
0.093** 
     - - - - 
   
(2.54) 
Total Institutional Ownership     
   
 
         
   
 
Low-turnover Institutional Ownership  - 
 
 0.058***  0.023*** -0.004 
      - 
 
 (14.52)  (11.56) (-0.39) 
Moderate-turnover Institutional Ownership   
 
 0.051***  0.018* -0.015 
       
 
 (4.68)  (1.78) (-0.81) 
High-turnover Institutional Ownership   
 
 0.080***  0.040* -0.055 
       
 
 (3.88)  (1.66) (-1.17) 
M&A Experience -   - 0.004 - -0.307*** 0.132 
 
-   - (0.06) - (-4.99) (1.58) 
Target Firm size 
 
- - 




   
 
Target Firm Industry-Relative Size 








     






Cons.     4.515***  1.331** 3.147*** 
 
    (9.52)  (2.54) (4.71) 
Firm specific control variables ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
Industry/Year controls ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
Obs.     2,576 485 2,868 2,596 
Pseudo R2 (%)     
   
 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
   
 - 9,889.6 - - 9,826.2 - 10,578.5 
Wald chi2(1) 
   
 2.93  0.63 0.81 
p-value  Wald test 
   
 (0.087)  (0.427) (0.368) 
Correctly classified (%) 86.14 87.02 86.71 80.59 62.27  58.23 65.22 
This table presents the results of probit regressions for estimating the probability of UK bidders acquiring full control of the target firm, based on 3,821 
M&As undertaken by UK listed firms from 01/01/2000 to 31/12/2010. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which equals to 1 when the M&As 
result in a full control (100%) of the target firm and 0 otherwise. The variables are defined as in Table 1. All accounting data are taken at year-end prior to 
the M&A deal announcement. Z-statistics based on cluster-adjusted robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009, hence providing robust interpretations 
(Cameron et al., 2008)) are reported in parentheses. Correctly classified (%) compares the fitted and actual values based on a 0.50 cut-off point ***, **, 
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 - -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 - 
6KDUH3D\PHQW     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 - 
)LQDQFLDO&ULVLV -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-    - - 
/DUJHVW,QVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRU     -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 - - 
7RS,QVWLWXWLRQDO2ZQHUVKLS -   -     
 (-3.76)   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/RZ-WXUQRYHU       
,QVWLWXWLRQDO2ZQHUVKLS       
0RGHUDWH-WXUQRYHU     -  
,QVWLWXWLRQDO2ZQHUVKLS     -  
+LJK-WXUQRYHU     - - 
,QVWLWXWLRQDO2ZQHUVKLS     - - 
0	$([SHULHQFH         
         
Target Firm Size        
        
Target Firm Industry-        
Relative Size       
&RQV 1.164 0.587  -   
 (11.32) (6.13)  -   
Firm specific control variables ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
Industry/Year controls ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
       
Obs.       
3VHXGR. R2        
This table presents the results of Tobit regressions for estimating the determinants of the deal size for 
cross-border M&As undertaken by UK bidders. The sample comprises 3,821 M&As undertaken by 
UK listed firms announced between 01/01/2000 and 31/12/2010. The dependent variable is Deal Size, 
measured as the natural logarithm of the deal value. We use a lower bound of £0.1m as it is one of the 
restrictions imposed during the sample selection process. The variables are defined as in Table 1. All 
accounting data are taken at year-end prior to the M&A deal announcement. Z-statistics based on 
cluster-adjusted robust standard errors (Petersen, 2009, hence providing robust interpretations 
(Cameron et al., 2008)) are reported in parentheses. Correctly classified (%) compares the fitted and 





























M&As All M&As 
CAR-1,+1 Mean 0.75% 0.33% 0.67% 0.50% 0.80% 0.72% 0.30% 0.38% 0.59% 
 
p-value (0.001) (0.198) (0.675) (0.639)  
 
Obs. 2,123 1,374 1,751 1,746 838 1,285 812 562 3,497 
 
SD 4.35% 2.96% 3.91% 3.83% 4.59% 4.19% 2.49% 3.53% 3.87% 
          
 
CAR-10,+10 Mean 0.48% 0.22% 0.54% 0.22% 0.49% 0.48% 0.02% 0.49% 0.38% 
 
p-value (0.266) (0.195) (0.983) (0.194)  
 
Obs. 2,123 1,374 1,751 1,746 838 1,285 812 562 3,497 
 
SD 7.86% 6.30% 7.75% 6.78% 7.36% 8.17% 5.55% 7.24% 7.28% 
          
 
CAR-1,+20 Mean 0.02% -0.20% 0.19% -0.32% -0.12% 0.11% -0.42% 0.12% -0.07% 
 
p-value (0.510) (0.138) (0.611) (0.278)  
 
Obs. 2,123 1,374 1,751 1,746 838 1,285 812 562 3,497 
 
SD 10.76% 8.82% 10.77% 9.25% 10.04% 11.21% 8.00% 9.88% 10.04% 
          
 
CAR-20,-2 Mean -0.25% -0.19% -0.24% -0.21% -0.15% -0.32% -0.30% -0.03% -0.23% 
 
p-value (0.748) (0.885) (0.521) (0.361)  
 
Obs. 2,123 1,374 1,751 1,746 838 1,285 812 562 3,497 
 







CAR -1,+1 CAR -10,+10 CAR -20,-2 
 
            
Cross Industry 0.001 
 
-0.001 0.001 0.001 
 






(-0.500) (0.370) (0.304) 
 
(0.920) (0.080) (-0.133) 
 
(1.150) (0.200) 
Cross-Border -0.004*** 0.003 0.002 -0.004* -0.001 0.020 0.015 -0.005 0.001 0.015 0.005 -0.002 
 
(-2.816) (0.440) (0.280) (-1.860) (-0.554) (1.550) (1.200) (-1.310) (0.445) (1.180) (0.410) (-0.520) 
Listed Target 0.001 
 
0.002 0.010 0.011 
 






(0.230) (1.180) (1.308) 
 





0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
(-1.060) (-0.570) (-0.300) 
 
(-1.170) (-0.220) (-0.510) 
 


























Share Payment 0.006** 
   
-0.003 
   
-0.002 
   
 
(2.000) 
   
(-0.571) 
   
(-0.719) 
   Financial Crisis -0.006*** -0.005 -0.005* -0.006*** -0.011*** -0.009 -0.016 -0.016*** -0.005** 0.002 0.000 -0.011 
 
(-3.064) (-1.460) (-1.840) (-2.660) (-3.441) (-1.160) (-2.380) (-3.710) (-2.027) (0.360) (0.000) (-3.140) 
Largest Institutional  
   
0.000 
   
0.000 
   
-0.001 
    Ownership 
   
(0.930) 
   
(-0.170) 
   
(-1.290) 
Top 5 Institutional  0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
    Ownership (-0.042) 
 
(1.190) (-1.050) (0.845) 
 
(0.240) (-0.280) (0.817) 
 
(1.350) (0.570) 
Foreign Institutional  
 
0.000 0.000*** 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
    Ownership 
 
(-1.360) (-2.820) (0.940) 
 
(-0.130) (-1.010) (1.210) 
 
(0.220) (1.130) (0.240) 





















































































Target Firm Size 
   
0.001 
   
0.001 
   
0.000 
    
(0.510) 
   
(0.590) 
   
(0.220) 














 Cons. 0.003 0.035 -0.005 0.057*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.051*** 0.106*** -0.007 0.002 0.000 0.019 
 
(0.619) (1.550) (-0.560) (3.350) (0.089) (-0.100) (-3.120) (4.600) (-0.577) (0.060) (-0.030) (0.780) 
Firm specific control 
variables ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥  ¥ ¥ ¥ 
Industry/Year controls ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥  ¥ ¥ ¥ 
             Obs. 3,243 536 656 1,265 3,063 536 656 1,265 3,063 536 656 1,265 
Adj R2 (%) 1.40 7.73 4.50 7.85 3.91 4.09 3.39 7.37 2.32 2.77 2.77 5.36 
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